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ABSTRACT 
In the last twenty years many features of Saaty's Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) have 
been criticised, especially the additive hierarchical composition of conventional AHP, 
which leads to the possibility of occurrence of the Rank Reversal phenomenon (adding an 
irrelevant alternative may cause a reversal in the ranking at the top). In the context of a 
variable number of alternatives this rank reversal possibility is likely to be a shortcoming of 
the aggregation method, since the global priorities obtained and the corresponding rankings 
can be seen, to some extent, as arbitrary. In this paper we show another feature of AHP 
which may be, and in many application contexts will indeed be, an even stronger 
shortcoming of the method. It consists in the fact that the addition of indifferent criteria (for 
which all alternatives perform equally) causes a significant alteration of the aggregated 
priorities of alternatives, with important consequences. Although not in three-level 
hierarchies, in more complex hierarchies rank reversal may happen. Since in almost all 
applications of AHP the set of criteria is not fixed ex-ante but is variable and is constructed 
in accordance with reasons of relevance and simplicity, almost all applications of AHP are 
potentially flawed.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Many authors, among them Watson and Freeling (1982, 1983),  Belton and Gear (1983) and 
Dyer (1990a, 1990b), have criticised Saaty's AHP because this aggregation method suffers Rank 
Reversal (an alternative chosen as the best out of a set X, fails to be chosen when another, perhaps 
unimportant, alternative is excluded from X).  
In general, these authors attribute this failure to the fact that, in Saaty’s method, the weight of 
each criterion is independent of the evaluations of the available alternatives with respect to this 
criterion, which is caused by the way in which the method elicits these weights from decision-makers 
(through questions like: By how much is this criterion more important than another one for the common 
goal?). More recently, Salo and Hämäläinen (1997), Weber (1997) and others have expressed a similar 
criticism of AHP. 
The authors conclude that, in order to avoid such a formal failure, the method must be changed 
in this particular aspect so that interval scales for the evaluation of local priorities on each criterion (not 
affected by the exclusion of any alternative) can be constructed. The proponents of the AHP method 
have shown a complete disagreement with this criticism  in their responses, for example in Saaty, 
Vargas and Wendell (1983), Saaty and Vargas (1984), Saaty (1990) and, recently, Saaty (1997).  
 Pérez (1995) tries to mediate in this controversy by arguing that a failure by an aggregation 
method to satisfy a formal property is not necessarily a symptom of something being wrong with that 
method, as demonstrated by the well-known fact that almost all ordinal aggregation methods exhibit 
Rank Reversal, and by the less well-known fact that all multidistrict proportional elections suffer from 
some form of this phenomenon. He continues by arguing that no aggregation method is expected to be 
suitable for every situation, since the situation may impose its specific rules and/or restrictions, and that, 
therefore, the proper questions are: What situations are appropriate for a given method? Is its algorithm   3 
suitable in those situations in which it is usually applied? The paper concludes that, to discuss the 
suitability or correctness of multicriteria aggregation methods, these should be analysed not only on 
formal grounds, but also in the real context in which they are to be applied. 
 In this paper, we propose a similar controversial question for Saaty’s method, relating to its 
behaviour when an indifferent criterion is added. It should be noted that we are dealing with the 
conventional approach to AHP, which is called the “distributive mode” in Saaty (1996, p. 132) and 
the “closed system (distributive synthesis)” in Forman and Gass (2001, p. 479). 
In most multicriteria decision problems, the set of alternatives and, above all, the set of criteria 
are not exogenous inputs, but are the results of the first steps of the analytical process in solving the 
problem. Therefore, it is crucial for any aggregation method to have an independence property which 
says that the addition of a new criterion, for which all the alternatives perform equally well, does not 
alter the previous aggregation results. This property, which can intuitively be interpreted as a kind of 
cancellation property, is important because it allows the analysis to concentrate on the relevant 
comparison criteria (those showing a disagreement among the performances of the different 
alternatives) and to ignore those criteria, potentially infinite in number, for which the alternatives 
perform equally. Indeed, if a method lacks this property, the results of any application of the method to 
a context in which the criteria are not fixed in advance (the usual application case) are indeterminate.  
Consider, for example, the paradigmatic illustration of AHP for the case of  choosing a house to 
live in. In the normal applications like this, it is not a viable analytical strategy to list all conceivable 
criteria (that is, all those with potential relevance). In general, a better strategy, which makes the 
problem tractable, would be to list and to study only those criteria that are known to be relevant on the 
basis of what is the set of potential alternatives to be considered as possible choices. If, for example, all 
the houses in the choice set are in a small town 50 miles from the working office, the “distance to the 
working office” criterion, although a priory important, is likely to be excluded from the analysis. On the   4 
other hand, if the houses in the choice set are scattered throughout the surroundings of the working 
office, that distance criterion is likely to be included in the analysis as a subcriterion of a general 
“Location” criterion . In a similar way of reasoning, some potential criteria like “distance to the beach”, 
“beauty of landscapes”, “degree of  light pollution”, “distance to health and educational services”, etc. 
could be included or excluded on the basis of simplicity and immediate relevance arguments. For 
applications of this kind, any aggregation method lacking the above described cancellation property 
would fail to give a valid solution, because its final results (global priorities of the alternative houses) 
would be dependent on which criteria, out of the large amount of potentially relevant indifferent criteria, 
have been included in the analysis. This is the case of the distributive AHP aggregation  method. 
Nevertheless, as shown by Pérez (1995), there are situations of a distributional nature, 
exemplified by the political multidistrict proportional elections framework, in which not only is the 
distributive AHP algorithm legitimate, but is also the only appropriate one. The appropriateness and 
necessity of this algorithm for these situations derives from the fact that the alternatives (political 
organizations legally constituted and formally registered for the election), the criteria (electoral districts 
or constituencies) and the weight of the criteria (percentage of the total number of seats allocated to 
each constituency) are indeed exogenous inputs established, by previous decisions and by the law, 
before the aggregation exercise takes place. 
 Thus, we do not propose in this paper a critique of a new internal or mathematical flaw of the 
Saaty´s method , but an analysis of a potential flaw, that is to say, a characteristic of this method which 
could cause (and , in our opinion, is likely to cause) errors in those applications of the method which 
lack the distributional characteristics of the above election framework.  
Next section analyses an example of rank reversal caused by the addition of an indifferent 
criterion, section 3 discusses the results of this example and section 4 considers a more general rank 
reversal situation.  In section 5 we present our conclusions.   5 
2. AN EXAMPLE OF RANK REVERSAL CAUSED BY THE ADDITION OF AN 
INDIFFERENT CRITERION 
 
2.1 Three-level hierarchies 









The vector of priorities is: 
 f(M) =   ((0.2)(0.5)+(0.6)(0.5), (0.8)(0.5)+(0.4)(0.5)) =   (0.4, 0.6)   
Thus, for M the chosen alternative would be x2. 
 
 If we add the indifferent criterion C3, and give to C3 the same weight as the total of the previous 
criteria, we obtain the new decision matrix M’ :   6 
GLOBAL AIM
C1 C2 C3
x1 0.2  0.6      0.5
x2 0.8 0.4   0.5
(0.25)  (0.25)      (0.5)
M*
 
The revised vector of priorities is: 
f(M*) =  ((0.2)(0.25)+(0.6)(0.25)+(0.5)(0.5), (0.8)(0.25)+(0.4)(0.25)+(0.5)(0.5)) = (0.45, 0.55).  
 Although this vector has changed in that the margin of victory for x2 has decreased, rank 
reversal has not taken place and for M* the chosen alternative would remain x2. 
 
Let us analyse a general three-level situation: 
GLOBAL AIM
Previous criteria New criterion
C1 C2 ...    Cm Cm+1
x1 a11 a12 ...    a1m 1/n
Alternatives: x2 a21 a22 ...    a2m 1/n
.......................
xn an1 an2 ...   anm 1/n
Weights: w1 w2 ...   wm wm+1
 





















































































The differences in priorities between two alternatives xk and xr  before and after including Cm+1 are 
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D , implying that the inclusion of the indifferent criterion Cm+1 has caused a decrease in the 
robustness of this ranking. 
 It is thus obvious that, for a three-level hierarchy a rank reversal can not happen. However, if we 
embed the addition of an indifferent criterion into a deeper hierarchy, rank reversal can happen, as 
shown below.  
 
2.2 Four level hierarchies 
Let the following four level situation be: 
GLOBAL AIM
D1 (0.5) D'1 (0.5)
C1 C2 C3 C'1 C'2
x1 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.35 0.8
x2 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.65 0.2
(0.5) (0.5) (1) (0.5) (0.5)
M
M* M'
   8 
D1 and D’1 are the criteria. C1, C2, C3 are subcriteria of D1, and C’1, C’2 are subcriteria of D’1.  
If  C3 had not been added, the vectors of local priorities for M an M’ would have been: 
 f(M) = ((0.2)(0.5)+(0.6)(0.5), (0.8)(0.5)+(0.4)(0.5)) = (0.4, 0.6)   and    
 f(M’) = ((0.35)(0.5)+(0.8)(0.5), (0.65)(0.5)+(0.2)(0.5)) = (0.575, 0.425) 
and applying the hierarchical composition to M+M’: 
  Global Priority for x1: (0.4)(0.5)+(0.575)(0.5) = 0.4875 
 Global Priority for x2: (0.6)(0.5)+(0.425)(0.5) = 0.5125 
Thus, for M+M’ the chosen alternative would be x2. 
 
 Assuming that subcriterion C3 is added (with a weight equal as the sum of that of C1 and C2), 
and keeping the same weights for criteria D1 and D’1, the vectors of local priorities for M* and M’ are: 
 f(M*) = ((0.2)(0.25)+(0.6)(0.25)+(0.5)(0.5), (0.8)(0.25)+(0.4)(0.25)+(0.5)(0.5)) = (0.45, 0.55).
 f(M’) = ((0.35)(0.5)+(0.8)(0.5), (0.65)(0.5)+(0.2)(0.5)) = (0.575, 0.425) 
and applying the hierarchical composition to M* + M’: 
  Global Priority for x1: (0.45)(0.5)+(0.575)(0.5) = 0.5125 
 Global Priority for x2: (0.55)(0.5)+(0.425)(0.5) = 0.4875 
Thus, for M* + M’ the chosen alternative is x1 and Rank Reversal has taken place. 
 
3. DISCUSSION OF THE EXAMPLE. 
  
This example shows that an alternative (here x2) which has the higher global priority in a four-
level hierarchy can lose its top ranking when a new and indifferent subcriterion is added. The reason is 
that this addition degrades the advantage which x2 had gained over x1 in the subhierarchy below D1, 
because the vector of partial priorities (0.4, 0.6) has become (0.45, 0.55), and this degraded advantage is   9 
not capable of counteracting the advantage which x1 had gained over x2 in the subhierarchy below D’1, 
with partial priorities vector (0.575, 0.425).  
 It is necessary to stress the fact that the AHP aggregation algorithm does not have an internal 
flaw causing incorrect behaviour when an indifferent criterion is added. On the contrary, since this 
algorithm is defined as being suited to the distributional aspects of the hierarchies, its formal properties 
are very desirable from a distributional point of view. Indeed, it is easy to see that, in the general three-
level situation analysed above, the only vector (up to a positive proportional factor) of local priorities 
for the new criterion Cm+1, for which the inclusion of this criterion would not cause any perturbation to 

























































‘ , will in 
general alter the resulting global priorities vector, thus making room, if this addition is embedded in a 
hierarchy of four or more levels, for a reversal of order, as shown in the example above.  
 In other words, the AHP algorithm has its own cancellation property:  
 
CPAHP:  In three-level hierarchies, the changes in the global priorities of every alternative, 
caused by the addition of a new criterion, cancel out when the local priorities 
corresponding to the new criterion are proportional to the previous global ones. 
 
 However, the point we want to make is that, in most applications like the “buying of a house” 
case, the nature of these applications is “additive” rather than distributive, and therefore the cancellation 
property that must be applied (and the one that usually is implicitly applied) is the following one: 
   10 
CP:   In three-level hierarchies, the changes in the global priorities of every alternative, 
caused by the addition of a new criterion, cancel out when the local priorities 
corresponding to the new criterion are all the same, that is to say, when the new one is 
an indifferent criterion. 
 
 One could try to dismiss the importance of the critique proposed in this paper by arguing that 
exact indifferent criteria occur only exceptionally, but it is obvious that the examples analysed above 
could easily be adapted to deal with criteria that are only approximately indifferent.  
 Another argument against the critique proposed in the paper would be to say that an indifferent 
or quasi-indifferent criterion, being incapable of making a difference among the alternatives, deserves a 
small weight value. This argument is in line with the one used in Formann and Gass (2001, p. 484), 
illustrated with an example involving two alternative bridges, in which the authors propose a bottom up 
approach in assigning criteria weights, contradicting the top-down approach required by the third axiom 
of AHP (which states that priorities of the elements of a hierarchy should not depend on lower level 
elements), in order to obtain an intuitively appealing result. We consider that this line of defense is 
invalid because it leads to a situation where change in AHP is unjustified and ad hoc, instead of being 
properly justified and systematic. 
 
4. RANK REVERSAL IN A MORE GENERAL SITUATION 
 
 It is worth noting that this rank reversal phenomenon can also occur in AHP when a new 
criterion is added for which the largest priority corresponds precisely to the alternative which also has 
the largest prior global priority.  
 To be specific, if in the above example the vector of partial priorities for the added new criterion   11 
C3 had been (0.48, 0.52) instead of (0.5, 0.5), the vectors of local priorities for M* and M’ would have 
become: 
    f(M*) = ((0.2)(0.25)+(0.6)(0.25)+(0.5)(0.48), (0.8)(0.25)+(0.4)(0.25)+(0.5)(0.52)) = (0.44, 0.56). 
    f(M’) = ((0.35)(0.5)+(0.8)(0.5), (0.65)(0.5)+(0.2)(0.5)) = (0.575, 0.425) 
and through hierarchical composition, keeping unaltered the weights of criteria D1 and D’1, we would 
have obtained the global priorities vector (0.5075, 0.4925), which means that x1 would have won for 
M* + M’ and Rank Reversal would still have taken place. 
This last example shows that an alternative (here x2) which has the higher global priority in a 
four-level hierarchy can lose its primacy when a new subcriterion is added in which this alternative also 
has the higher local priority. The reason is similar: although we add a new subcriterion which favours 
x2, globally ranked first, this addition degrades the advantage which x2 had gained over x1 in the 
subhierarchy below D1, transforming the partial priorities vector (0.4, 0.6) in (0.44, 0.56), and this 
degraded advantage is not capable of counteracting the advantage x1 had gained over x2 in the 
subhierarchy below D’1, with partial priorities vector (0.575, 0.425).  
This situation is closely related to the no-show paradox, a failure of consistency affecting some 
ordinal aggregating rules (or voting methods). In a strong version of this paradox, a group of identical 
voters whose favourite candidate is x is added to a voting body who has already elected x as the winner, 
and the consequence of this voter’s addition is that x ceases to be the winner of the election. In a mild 
version for the case when voters’ preferences are not necessarily strict, a group of identical voters, for 
whom  x is a favourite candidate among others, is added to a voting body which has already elected x as 
the winner, and this addition causes x to fail to be elected. Pérez (2001) has shown that the first version 
of the paradox affects many Condorcet voting methods, and the second version affects all Condorcet 
methods. 
   12 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, from the point of view of choosing the best alternatives, the distributive AHP 
aggregation method has two major potential drawbacks. The first is that the method fails to satisfy the 
minimal properties of subset choice consistency, which forces the chosen alternative to respond in a 
coherent way to the contraction or enlargement of the set of alternatives under consideration. This 
drawback is illustrated by the well-known rank reversal phenomenon caused by the addition of a new 
and irrelevant alternative. The second, analysed in this paper, is that the method fails to satisfy the 
minimal properties of merging-criteria consistency, which forces the chosen alternative to respond in a 
coherent way to the addition or deletion of criteria. In our opinion, these two unpleasant characteristics 
are just the negative consequences of the distributive nature of a model, Saaty’s distributive AHP, 
which can be described as elegant, simple and hierarchies-friendly. 
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